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Introduction 
Po~ers of appointment play an important role in estate planning. The 
proper use of powers can give great flexibility to an estate plan without 
incurring any transfer tax whatsoever. Needless to say, the price of such 
benefits is careful adherence 1to the requirements of the tax law. Fortu- 
nately, the rules in this area are among the clearest and best settled in 
the transfer tax field. The problems that do arise often seem to result from 
failure to understand the wide latitude the existing rules give the planner 
in meeting a client's wishes. In other words, there is little or no need to 
operate at the undefined fringe of the transfer tax system in using powers 
of appointment in estate planning. 
The following discussion of powers of appointment emphasizes what 
can be done within the well-established rules. After an introduction to 
the property law of powers and the accompanying terminology, I sum- 
marize the tax treatment of powers and introduce the difference between 
"special" and "general" powers. The discussion then moves to consid- 
ering these rules in the context of estate planning. First, I outline the · 
situations in which a taxable power may be useful. These are limited in 
number but of great importance in accomplishing certain common estate 
planning goals. Equally common goals should be accomplished through 
the creation of nontaxable powers. The rest of the chapter, therefore, 
deals with different methods of giving the object of a client's bounty access r 
to property transferred by the client without creating transfer tax con- 
sequences for the beneficiary. 
349 
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POWERS OF APPOINfMENf: DEFINITIONS AND 
BASIC RULES 
The power of appointment is first and foremost part of Anglo-American 
property law. Its history is complex but its present role is as straightfor- 
ward as it is important. It is, in broadest terms, a device for giving someone 
a greater or lesser degree of control of the distribution of property in the 
future, which control can then be exercised in the light of circumstances 
then existing that cannot be foreseen _at the time the power is created. 
The simplest example involves a trust created by A for the benefit of his 
child 13 for life. At B's death the trust will terminate and be distributed 
to such of B's children. in such proportions as B shall designate in B's 
''will, and if B makes no designation, to B's children in equal shares. B's 
ability to choose who will receive how much of the trust is a power of 
appointment. A is the donor of the power and B the donee. B's children 
are permissible objects of the power and they are also the takers in default 
of B's exercising the power. Because B could only exercise the power by 
will it is a testamentary power of appointment. Powers can also be ex- 
ercised during life and are then described as inter vivos powers, or as 
powers of appointment by deed, since they usually must be exercised by 
a document executed with the formalities required for the transfer of real 
property. Unless forbidden by the instrument creating the power, inter 
vivos powers can also be exercised by will. 
In estate planning terms, A is the client for whom the plan is created. 
The tax status of the power, however, will affect B's transfer tax situation. 
The creation of the power by A may involve transfer tax, of course. In 
the example above, if the trust were created inter vivos A would have 
made a completed transfer for gift tax purposes. If the trust were testa- 
mentary, the trust property would be taxed as part of A's estate. The 
taxation of powers of appointment, however, involves taxation of the 
donee, that is, of the person holding the power. In other words, in for- 
mulating an estate plan involving powers 'of appointment the planner must 
keep in mind that the estate tax and gift tax effects of the powers, if any, 
will be borne by someone other than the client for whom the plan is 
created. The ramifications of the plan, therefore, are more widespread · 
than they would be otherwise and the careful planner may very well have 
to broaden the search for information relevant to the plan. 
<"' 
Not every power of appointment, however, results in taxation to the do- 
nee. The gift tax in Internal Revenue Code Section 2514 and the estate tax 
in Section 2041 divide all powers ofappointment into two classes: general 
powers of appointment and special powers of appointment. The distinction 
between the two is simple to state. A general power is a power that is exer- 
cisable in favor of the donee, the do nee 's estate, the do nee 'screditors, or the 
creditors of the donee's estate.' Special powers are all other powers. 
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The listing of the four' objects of appointment that create a general 
power has been construed to be disjunctive. The ability to appoint to any 
one of the four will create a general power of appointment. 2 In addition, 
the power to appoint property to satisfy taxes, debts, or other changes 
enforceable against the donee's estate is a general power of appointment, 
as is a power to appoint property to satisfy the donee's legal obligations, 
such as those of support.3 Roughly put, the transfer tax system treats as 
general powers those that allow the donee to use the property over which 
the power is applicable as if it were the donee's own. 
Any other power of appointment is a special power of appointment. 
The Treasury Regulations specifically state that the special power may, 
be worded in a broad or narrow manner. That is, the power may be one 
to appoint to anyone other than the four entities that define a general 
power of appointment, or one to appoint to specific persons or classes of 
, persons none of which is the donee, the donee's estate, the donee's cred- 
itors, or the creditors of the donee's estate.4 ' 
Classifying a power as general or special determines the treatment of 
the power for estate and gift tax purposes. Under 1.R.C. Section 2041 the 
donee of a general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, 
is considered the owner of the appointive property. All property subject 
to the power on the date 'of death is included in the donee's gross estate.5 
All that is required is that the general power of appointment exist. The 
donee's lack of capacity to exercise the power for reasons of minority or 
incompetency is irrelevant. 6 Nor is it necessary that the general power of 
appointment be exercisable by will. An inter vivos power that ends with 
the donee's death is in existence at death and will lead to tax.7 
Property subject to a general power of appointment created on or 
before October 21, 1942,'is included in the donee's gross estate only to 
the ex-tent of property as to which the general power of appointment is 
exercised.8 This difference in treatment depending on the date of creation 
of the power reflects the somewhat complicated history of estate tax 
treatment of general powers of appointment. 9 The change in treatment 
led to a transition rule for partial releases of general powers, which is 
preserved in the statute." 
While the number of "pre-1942 powers," as they are often called, 
decreases with every passing year, it is still possible in the late 1980s to 
encounter such relics of the old law. Because these pre-1942 powers result 
in estate tax only if exercised, the estate planner must be aware of the 
state law regarding exercise of a general power of appointment. In a 
minority of states a general residuary clause will exercise a general power 
of appointment held by the testator by adding the appointive property to 
the residue. The result would be, of course, the taxing of the appointive 
property in the donee's estate. The problem can be avoided by adding to 
the will an express refusal to exercise any power of appointment held. 
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The addition of such boilerplate as a prophylactic measure should be 
considered whenever a will is drafted. 
The gift tax treatment of general powers is also based on the analogy 
between holding a general power of appointment and outright ownership. 
The inter vivas exercise of a general power of appointment no matter 
when created is a transfer of the appointive property for gift tax purposes. 
.The gift tax effect will depend on the extent to which the transfer is 
complete, on the availability of exclusions and deductions and indeed on 
every variable that enters into the analysis of any other transfer of prop- 
erty by a donor. For. a general power of appointment created on or before 
October 21, 1942, the analysis ends here.11 
A general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, need ... . not be exercised, however, to cause gift tax consequences. The release 
or lapse of such a power during the donee' s life will also result in a transfer 
of property for gift tax purposes. The concept of release is a straightfor- 
ward one. It requires some act by the donee that extinguishes the power. 
By giving up the power to direct the property to himself, his estate, his 
creditors, or the creditors of his estate, the donee of the power becomes 
the transferor of the property subject to the power. Whether or not a gift 
results depends on the application of the principles of the gift tax. 
A lapse occurs when the donee does nothing and the power disappears 
by its own terms. For example, a trust meeting the requirements ofl.R.C. 
·section 2503(c) is a popular vehicle for making gifts to a minor. All ad- 
ditions to such a trust qualify for the present interest exclusion of Section 
2503(b) up to the dollar limits of that section. The trust property must 
pass to the beneficiary at age 21. Be_cause many donors feel that 21 is too 
young an age at which to give a person outright ownership of substantial 
property many of these trusts are drafted to give the minor beneficiary· 
the right to terminate the trust and acquire the trust property during a 
short period of time after attaining the age of 21 years. If the termination 
right is not exercised the trust continues until the beneficiary reaches a 
rpore mature age. The donor, of course, hopes· that the beneficiary can 
be convinced of the wisdom of not exercising the termination right. 
The right to end the trust and acquire the trust property, however, is 
a right to appoint to oneself and is therefore a general power of appoint- 
ment. If the beneficiary does not exercise the power it ends. This extin- 
guishing by its own terms is a lapse of tfie powe;. For gift tax purposes 
the beneficiary (who is the donee of the power) is the transferor of all the 
trust property. In other words, the beneficiary is treated as the creator 
of the trust. Whether or not there is a completed gift depends, of course, 
· on the terms of the trust. 
To summarize, a general power of appointment created after October 
21, 1942, is the equivalent of outright ownership for purposes of the gift 
tax. A release or a lapse of such a power is a transfer. If the property 
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over which the power applies is in trust, the release or lapse is the equiv- 
alent of the donee of the power taking the property out of the trust and 
then putting it back in. The release or lapse does .not change the terms 
of the original disposition of the property by the donor of the general 
power of appointment; it simply makes the donee the author of those 
terms. 
A donee can get rid of an unwanted general power of appointment 
without triggering the consequences of a lapse or release. It is possible 
to make a qualified disclaimer of the power under Section 2518.12 The 
requirements of that section must be met of course, and state law must 
allow the disclaimer of a general power of appointment. It is possible that 
the enactment of Section 2514(c)(3) applicable to disclaimers made after 
'December 31, 1981, allows the disclaimer of a general power of appoint- 
ment effective for federal transfer tax purposes regardless of the provi- 
, sions of state law, but the point is unclear and probably will remain so 
until regulations are issued under this subsection. 
If estate tax results from the inclusion of property subject to a general 
power of appointment held by the decedent, the code provides a special 
rule placing liability for the tax on the recipient of the property (whether 
an appointee or a taker in default) in Section 2207. That section allows 
the decedent's estate to recover from the recipient "such portion of the 
total tax paid as the value of such property bears to the taxable estate." 
The appointive property, therefore, is assumed to pay estate tax at the 
average rate to which the estate is subject. If the taxable estate absent 
the appointive property is small, perhaps so small that tax would be totally 
offset by the unified credit, it is possible that all the tax due is caused by 
the operation of Section 2041. If the estate beneficiaries and the recipients 
of the appointive property are different persons, Section 2207 will in effect 
cause the former to bear some of the estate tax liability caused by property 
going solely to the latter. This problem is easily eliminated, at least in 
testate estates. The rule of Section 2207 operates "[ujnless the decedent 
directs otherwise in his will" and therefore can be overriden by a tax 
apportionment clause. Such a clause could easily direct that the appointive 
property bear the increase in estate tax caused by its inclusion in the 
gross estate under Section 2041. The choice ofan appropriate tax appor- 
tionment clause is an important part of estate planning subject to many 
considerations. It is important to realize, however, that the code provides 
a rule with regard to tax caused under Section 2041 that may not be to 
every client's liking but will operate unless steps are taken to avoid it., 
Special powers of appointment have no estate or gift tax effect what- 
soever. One may die possessed of a special power, exercise one during 
life, or allow it to lapse, or release it, and there will be no need to be 
concerned with estate or gift tax, except perhaps in one limited situation. 
The government has maintained that the exercise of a special power of 
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appointment that has the effect of extinguishing another interest of the 
donee of the power in the appointive property that could itself be disposed 
of without reference to the special power results in a gift of that interest.13 
One situation, which has actually been litigated, involved an income ben- 
eficiary of a trust who was also the donee of a special power of appoint- 
ment by deed over the corpus of the trust. The exercise of the special 
power by appointing all the trust property to permitted appointees would 
be a gift under Section 2511 of the value of the income interest if the 
analysis above is correct. In Self v. United States the Court of Claims 
disagreed with the government's position and found that· the income in- 
terest was terminated rather than transferred. 14 The Internal Revenue 
Service declared it would not follow Self" and finally prevailed on the 
same issue in the Tax Court in Estate of Regester. '6 The Tax Court spe- 
cifically stated that it would not follow Self, and for now the matter is in 
that limbo of conflicting authority from which clients should be preserved.17 
ESTATE PLANNING WITH POWERS OF 
APPOINTMENT 
The Usesof General Powers 
It. should be obvious from the foregoing discussion that the deliberate 
creation of a taxable or nontaxable power of appointment is a fairly simple 
matter. Assuming for the moment what will be discussed at length below, 
that is, that there are many different ways to inadvertently create a general 
power of appointment, why would any planner deliberately advise that a 
client give a donee the power to appoint to the donee, the donee's cred- 
itors, the donee's estate, or the creditors of the donee 's estate? There are 
three specific planning goals that supply the answer to that question. 
The first, and perhaps the most important, is the desire to create a 
Section 2056(b )(5) or Section 2523( e) general power of appointment marital 
deduction trust. No marital deduction is allowed for estate or gift tax 
c'purposes for the transfer of a terminable interest to a spouse. The defi- 
nition of that term includes a life income interest in a trust the remainder 
of which is given to someone other than the spouse or the spouse's estate. 
If, however, the income interest is of ~ certain sort, defined by statute 
and regulation, and if the spouse has a general power of appointment over 
the trust, the propertytransferred to the trust Will qualify for the marital 
deduction.18 
The requisite power of appointment is not quite the same as the 
general power of appointment defined in Sections 2041 and 2514. First, 
the power must be "exercisable in favor of such ... spouse, or of the 
estate of such ... spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each 
case the power is exercisable in favor of others."19 This marital deduction 
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general power of appointment, therefore, is a sort of subset of all general 
powers of appointment. Of the four objects of appointment that define a 
general'power of'appointrnent, only two, the donee and the donee's estate, 
will create a.general power of appointment that satisfies the requirements 
of the marital deduction. In addition, both the estate tax and the gift tax 
sections require that the power be "exercisable by such spouse alone and 
in all events." The careful drafter will include precisely those words in 
the actual power. In fact, the terms of the power of appointment necessary 
to obtain the marital deduction are all set out in the statute and the careful 
planner will not depart from them." There is, however, no problem with 
the creator of the power specifying takers in default who will receive the 
trust property should the spouse not exercise the power. 
Some formal limitations on the exercise of the power are 'allowed. 
For instance, the spouse can be required to make specific reference to 
. the power in the spouse's will or to exercise the power only in a will 
executed after the death of the first spouse to die. Powers exercisable 
during life can be required to be exercised in a particular form and the 
spouse can be required to give notice to the trustee of exercise. 21 Anything 
more, however, will ruin the estate plan. Clearly, innovation is not at a 
premium here. l 
The properly drafted power will, of course, require the inclusion of 
the trust property in the spouse's estate if the spouse dies possessed of 
the power, or it will result in gift tax if the spouse uses an inter vivos 
power to transfer trust property or releases the power· or allows it to 
lapse. This result is an integral· part of the rationale of the marital deduc- 
tion: what is deducted in the estate of the spouse first to die is taxed in 
the estate of the spouse second to die (to the extent it has not been 
consumed during life) or as the surviving spouse makes gifts of the prop- 
erty. Since ultimate taxability is the goal, the deduction may be secured 
by either a testamentary or an inter vivos power. If only the former is 
given, the spouse can make no inter vivos transfer of the property and 
since no one may hold a power to transfer property to anyone other than 
the spouse taxability is assured. If only an inter vivos power is given, 
Section 2041 will still tax any property left in the trust at the spouse's 
death because the decedent did indeed possess the power at death. 
The choice of the Section 2056(b )(5) trust as thd vehicle for obtaining 
the marital deduction must depend, of course, on the needs, desires, and 
circumstances of each client. One possible advantage of this sort of ar- 
rangement involves the general power of appointment itself. A person 
who receives property either through the exercise or the lapse of a general 
power of appointment may disclaim the property within nine months of 
the exercise or lapse of the power.22 In the typical marital deduction 
situation this ability to disclaim within nine months of the death of the 
second spouse to die may be of advantage. Assume that the surviving 
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spouse is the beneficiary of a Section 2056(b )(5) trust. The takers in default 
of the spouse's exercise of the general power of appointment are the 
descendents then living of the couple with the distribution to be made per 
stirpes. If at the death of the spouse beneficiary the children of the mar- 
riage are living they will take the trust property in absence of an appoint- 
ment. If those children are of mature age they may desire to pass the 
trust property directly to their children in preference' to swelling their 
own estates. Since they have nine months after their parent's death to 
disclaim the trust property, they can make that decision at the last minute. 
If the marital deduction property were held in a testamentary qualified 
terminable interest property (QTIP) trust the contingent remainders in 
that trust- would have to be disclaimed, if at all, within nine months of 
the death of the spouse whose will created the trust. 23 
The second situation in which a general power of appointment may 
be deliberately created involves the new generation-skipping transfer tax 
enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The new tax is 
levied at the highest estate tax rate.24 It does not apply, however, to 
transfers otherwise subject to estate or gift taxation with respect to a 
person one generation below the transferor. 25 If a member of that gen- 
eration is given a general power of appointment in order to "force" tax- 
ation of property in his or her estate, there will be less tax paid than if 
the generation-skipping transfer tax were to apply, so long as that person's 
marginal estate tax bracket is less than the maximum rate. For example, 
parent sets up a trust with child as life income beneficiary, remainder to 
grandchildren. The child has an "interest"> the termination of which will 
be a taxable event. 27 The trust corpus will at that time be subject to tax 
at the prevailing maximum estate tax rate. If, however, the child holds a 
general power of appointment over the trust, the trust property will be 
included in child's gross estate and will not be subject to the generation- 
skipping transfer tax. If the child's marginal estate tax rate is less than 
the maximum rate, there will be a tax saving through the general power 
of appointment. 28 
,' Finally, the inter vivos general power of appointment may be useful 
in circumventing certain problems raised by the rule against perpetuities. 
Generally speaking, the, perpetuities period starts anew for dispositions 
made through exercise of an inter vivos general power of appointment 
but relates back to the time of the creation of the power when a disposition 
is made by exercise of a special power of appointment or of a testamentary 
general power. AIJ inter vivos general power, therefore, may be useful if 
the donor wishes to give the donee the alternative of appointing the prop- 
erty in further trust for a period that would violate the rule against per- 
petuities as measured from the time of the creation of the power. 
This relationship between the rule against perpetuities and powers of 
appointment has had one effect on Section 2041. In some states the per- 
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petuities period runs from the exercise of a testamentary power, be it 
special or general. Under such a statute it is possible to create a perpetual 
private trust through the creation of a series of life estates with special 
'testamentary powers of appointment over the remainder. The trust prop- 
erty would thus forever escape transfer taxation. In order to prevent this 
result, Section 2041(a)(3) provides that assets subject to a special power 
of appointment are included in the gross estate of the donee of a special 
power of appointment if the donee exercises the power "by creating 
another power of appointment which under the applicable local law can 
be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of any estate or interest 
in such property ... for a period ascertainable without regard to the date 
of the creation of the first power." In other words, the price of starting 
the perpetuities period anew is taxation. In addition, it is important to 
realize that the statutory language goes beyond simply closing the loophole c 
created in a few states. If a special power is exercised so as to create an 
inter vivos general power the statutory requirement quoted above will be 
fulfilled: the special power will have been exercised to create a power 
from the exercise of which the perpetuities period will begin .to run anew. 
Every donee of a special power must be aware ~f this trap. 
The Unintentional Creation of General Powers in Pursuit of 
Planning Goals 
If the rules for the creation of a general power of appointment are as straight- 
forward as they have been described and if the situations in which they are 
useful are as limited as they appear to be, the reader may be justified in won- 
dering why the fuss. Unfortunately, a closer examination of the rules sur- 
rounding the taxation of powers of appointment is fully justified. It is possible 
to create a general power of appointment in many ways besides giving a 
donee the power to appoint to one or more of the magic quartet. The re- 
sulting unintentional creation of a general power of appointment is often the 
byproduct of the attempt to meet one or more common planning goals. For- 
tunately, these goals can generally be accomplished well within the limits 
of Section 2041. The remainder of this chapter first describes the major pit- 
falls and then attempts to set out some straightforward ways of working 
within Section 2041 and thus avoiding taxation. 
Even though the donee may not have the power to appoint to one of 
the four entities that figure in the definition of a general power of ap- 
pointment, the power cannot be properly classified unless the takers In 
default are considered. If the takers in default of exercise of the power 
include one or more of the definitional quartet, the power is a general 
power. The theory behind this result is quite simple. By not exercising 
the power the donee can in effect appoint to the takers in default. In this 
context, not to choose is to choose.29 
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Clearly, takers in default have to be chosen with care. Usually, the 
takers in default are objects of the bounty of the donorof the power of 
appointment. The power itself is created to provide flexibility. The donor 
probably assumes that in the absence of special circumstances the power 
will. not be exercised and the appointive property will be distributed to 
the takers in default. If this situation is indeed the usual one surrounding 
the creation of a power of appointment, the inadvertent creation of a 
general power should seldom occur; the takers in default would always 
be persons (or perhaps a charitable entity) other than the donee, the 
donee's creditors, the donee's estate, or the creditors of the donee's 
es fate. 
One situation related to the possibility of the identity of the takers in 
default creating a general power of appointment has been litigated. The 
question involves the status of insurance settlement options selected by 
the insured that provide for an annuity to the beneficiary followed by 
distribution of the principal to the executor of the beneficiary's estate. 
The Seventh Circuit has held that the principal was not includable in the 
deceased beneficiary's estate.> The Fifth Circuit, however, construed a 
similar provision to be a general power of appointment on the theory that 
the-payment to the decedent's estate subjected the fund to her unfettered 
control.31 While the technical basis for the Fifth Circuit's holding may be 
questioned, it does emphasize the need to consider the destination of 
property in the absence of an "appointment" by the decedent. 
A far more common situation in which a general power of appointment 
may be inadvertently created exists whenever a beneficiary has power to 
appropriate trust property to himself or herself. The Treasury Regulations 
make clear that such a power is a general power of appointment: "[I]f a 
trust instrument provides that the beneficiary may appropriate or consume 
the principal of the trust, the power to consume or appropriate is a power 
of appointment."32 Similarly, a power in a beneficiary "to affect the ben- 
eficial enjoyment of trust property or its income by altering, amending, 
,. or revoking the trust instrument or terminating the trust is a power of 
· appointment" that may be general-if the beneficiary can benefit from the 
exercise of the power.33 
It must also be realized that the provisions of the Regulation quoted 
above do not apply only to trusts. Any, similar arrangement will also fall 
within the ambit of Section 2041. Perhaps the most common, and the most 
troublesome, is the legal life estate coupled with a power to consume. 
Depending on the local law oflife estates and waste, the power to consume 
may be a general power of appointment." The extent of the life tenant's 
rights and responsibilities, of course, is set by state law. In the absence 
of specific language in the instrument creating the legal -life estate the - 
exact nature of those rights and responsibilities may be unclear. Litigation 
over the matter in the federal courts may require those courts to interpret 
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state law in the absence of definitive holdings of the highest court of the 
state.35 
A similar situation arises when a beneficiary is also trustee and as 
trustee has,the power to appoint trust property to himself or herself. Such 
a power may be a general power of appointment depending on the terms 
governing the decision to make the self-benefiting payment. Suffice it to 
say for now, an unlimited discretionary power to make payments to one- 
self, even if it is exercised in a fiduciary capacity, is a general power of 
appointment. So common is the inadvertent creation of a general power 
of appointmentin a trustee beneficiary that some states, most prominently 
New York, prohibit a trustee beneficiary from participating in decisions 
to benefit himself or herself.36 At least one federal district court has found 
that state case law created a similar prohibition. In Garfield v. United 
States37 the court held that Massachusetts case law established the prin- 
ciple that in cases of "ambiguity" a trustee beneficiary did not have the 
power to decide to make payments to himself. Such savings provisions, 
of course, will vary from state to state, but they would seem to be frail 
reeds on which to rest an estate plan. In addition, a statute like that in 
New York in effect requires that a discretionary trust have at least one 
trustee who is not a beneficiary. 1 ' 
It should be noted here that an independent trustee may have the 
broadest discretion to pay property to a beneficiary for any reason without 
the beneficiary having a general power of appointment. So long as the 
beneficiary can only compel the trustee to honestly exercise discretion 
the beneficiary has no taxable power over the trust. 38 
I 
Giving the Beneficiary Access to the Trust: Exceptions-the 
General Rule of Section 2041 
The foregoing discussion of the ways in which a general power of ap- 
pointment can be inadvertently created outlines the dangers to be avoided 
in creating an estate plan involving trusts or trust-like arrangements in 
which beneficiaries are to have rights of access.39 Such plans probably 
are quite common. While the advantages of trusts are many, especially 
when one is concerned for the continuity of management of assets that 
are to benefit the elderly or infirm, many clients probably feel that so long 
as beneficiaries are competent they should not have to go begging to an 
indifferent trustee in order to obtain access to trust property beyond what 
is required to be paid them on a-regular basis. , 
In addition, it would seem to be becoming more and more difficult, 
especially in large metropolitan areas, to find professional management 
of smaller trusts. In many situations, the beneficiary may be the most 
available and trusted fiduciary. For example, the creator of a family spray 
trust funded with the unified credit share of a relatively small estate may 
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very well feel that the surviving spouse and one or more of their children 
should be the persons charged with apportioning income and principal 
among a group of people including themselves. Even if professional fi- 
duciary services are available, the cost may be prohibitive unless the trust 
is invested in common trust funds or other collective investment vehicles. 
If the client prefers individualized investment advice there 'may be few 
alternatives to the trustee beneficiary. 
Given these assumptions the quest for ways to protect beneficiaries 
from possession of a general power of appointment assumes great im- 
portance. Fortunately, there are three basic techniques for accomplishing 
that end, each one based on a statutory exception to the definition of a 
general power of appointment contained in Section 2041(b)(l). The first 
involves powers subject to an "ascertainable standard" defined in Section 
2041(b)(l)(A), the second involves the so-called five and five power found 
in Section 2041(b)(2), and the third, joint powers dealt with in Section 
2041 (b)(l)(C). 
The first and most important of these exceptions removes from the 
definition of general power of appointment any "power to consume, in- 
vade, or appropriate property for the benefit of the decedent which is 
limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, 
support, or maintenance of the decedent.t'< The theory behind this ex- 
ception is a most sensible one. So Jong as the do nee' s ability to appropriate 
property is limited by a standard the exceeding of which would subject 
the donee to an action by others interested in the property and result in 
restoration of the wrongly appropriated property, the donee does not have 
that unfettered command over the property which is, for transfer tax 
purposes, the essence of the general power of appointment.41 In other 
words, a beneficiary can be given access to trust property governed by 
an ascertainable standard or as trustee can be given power to pay property 
to himself or herself subject to an ascertainable standard and there will 
be no transfer tax consequences arising from the possession of the power. 
,• The easiest way to create an ascertainable standard is to follow pre- 
cisely the language of the statute and regulations. Section 20.2041-l(c)(2) 
of Treasury Regulations states that "the extent of the holder's duty to 
exercise and not to exercise the power" is governed by an ascertainable 
standard if it is "reasonably measurable in terms of his needs for health, 
education, or support (or any combination of them.)" The regulation goes 
on to state that as far, as the Treasury is concerned support and mainte- 
nance "are synonymous and their meaning is not limited to the bare 
necessities of life." As an added bonus the regulation also gives examples 
of powers "limited by the requisite standard": 
"support," "support in reasonable comfort," "maintenance in health and 
reasonable comfort," "support in his accustomed manner of living," "edu- 
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cation, including college and professional education," "health," and "med- 
ical, dental, hospital and nursing expenses and expenses of invalidism." 
Finally, the regulation warns the planner what standards not to use: "A 
power to use property for the comfort, welfare, or happiness of the holder 
of the power is not limited by the requisite standard." 
Given the detail of this Treasury Regulation Section 20.2041-l(c)(2), 
the drafting of ascertainable standards should be an easy task. Assuming 
that the language approved by the regulation will allow accomplishing the 
client's desires within the context of local law governing trust adminis- 
tration, it is difficult to imagine what more could be desired. The approved 
language clearly allows payments to continue an accustomed standard of 
living that should, within the limits of local law, if any, allow increased 
distributions to take account of inflation. The language related to health 
should allow payments for the treatment of medical problems, even cat- 
astrophic illnesses. If the beneficiary is a young person, the approved 
language allows payments for education through the most advanced grad- 
uate levels. Finally, the regulation specifically states that "it is immaterial 
whether the beneficiary is required to exhaust his other income before 
the power can be exercised." 1 
In short, before the estate planner departs from the approved language 
of Treasury Regulation Section 20.2041-l(c)(2) in drafting a standard to 
govern a beneficiary's access to trust property the planner should be sure 
.that the client's desires can be met in no other way. Given the volume of 
litigation and administrative rulings, the Internal Revenue Service appears 
disposed to challenge any standard that departs from the approved lan- 
guage of the regulation. I~ addition, these challenges take a very narrow 
and technical view of what sort of language is equal to the approved 
language of the regulation. 
Perhaps the most striking example of the IRS's approach is Revenue 
Ruling 77-60.42 The facts of that ruling involved a decedent who had been 
given under the will of a predeceased spouse a life estate in certain prop- 
erties wifh power to invade corpus as desired "to continue the donee's 
accustomed standard ofliving." The ruling holds that the quoted language 
does not create an ascertainable standard because under that language 
payments could be made for expenditures going beyond the beneficiary's 
"needs for health, education or support." Taxability in this instance seems 
to turn on the single word "continue." If the standard of invasion had 
been phrased in terms of "support in the donee's accustomed manner of 
living" there would be perfect harmony with the statutory standard. ·- 
Of course, as noted above, the exact meaning of any standard used 
in a trust instrument, or in the creation of a legal life estate depends on 
local law. Presumably, if it could be shown that the approved language of 
the regulation a_ctually created under local law a standard .that was not 
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related to the beneficiary's needs for health, education, support, or main- 
tenance the beneficiary would indeed possess a general power of appoint- 
ment. 43 As a practical matter, however, the IRS would probably not be 
inclined to challenge any standard that conformed to the approved lan- 
guage of the regulation. Challenges are raised over "creative" drafting, 
with the IRS attempting to show that the standard does not relate to the 
statutory quartet and the taxpayer attempting to show that under local 
law the standard is "ascertainable" and related.to the four magic words. 
Such inquiries are complicated by the frequent lack of precedent from 
jhe highest state court and the consequent need for the federal court to 
make a decision about what the state law is. 
This is not to say that taxpayers always lose. Brantingham v. United 
States" involved the estate of a decedent who had been given a life estate 
in her late husband's residuary estate along with "the uncontrolled right, 
power and authority to use and devote such of the corpus thereof from 
time to time as in her judgment is necessary for her maintenance, comfort 
and happiness.":" In spite of the use of the word "happiness," which is 
specifically condemned by Treasury Regulation Section 20.2041-l(c)(2), 
the court found that this standard was indeed an ascertainable one within 
the meaning of Section 2041(b)(l)(A). The court's holding is based on its 
reading of Massachusetts law, which governed the trust. In Dana v. Gring46 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that a power to distribute 
principal for "happiness" of the beneficiary was governed by an objective, 
ascertainable standard because a reading of the dispositive instrument as 
a whole indicated that the creator of the trust intended to preserve its 
principal for eventual distribution to the remaindermen. 
The IRS has indicated its nonacquiescence in Brantingham on the 
rather strange ground that Dana v. Gring is inapplicable to the later case 
because the powerholder in Brantingham was not a fidcuiary as was the 
powerholder in Dana:" Presumably, the frank disapproval of the word 
"happiness" in the regulation was not seen as sufficient ground for dis- 
<' approving the Seventh Circuit's Brantingham decision. Of course, the 
IRS may be unwilling to raise thefederalism issue inherent in not following 
the highest court of a state on a matter 'of local property law. Whatever 
the reasons, however, pursuing an action to the highest level in order to 
establish the existence of an ascertainable standard is a stiff price to pay 
for correcting a problem that may very well have been avoided by careful 
drafting. 
Brantingham involved the word "happiness." Another troubled word 
in this area is "emergency." The fondness of draftspeople for the word is 
understandable. Many, perhaps most, clients feel sure that whatever hap- 
pens a beneficiary should have access to a trust if an emergency arises. 
After all, what is the use of having a pool of capital preserved for a bene- 
ficiary's needs if it cannot be drawn on when it is really needed? The IRS, 
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however, maintains that emergencies can be related to matters other than 
health, education, support, or maintenance and therefore a standard of in- 
vasion or encroachment to meet "emergencies" does not satisfy Section 
2041(b)(l)(A). The Tax Court accepted this argument in its decision in Es- 
tate of Sowell.48 On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit disagreed.49 The 
appellate court found that under the law of New Mexico that governed the 
trust the word "emergency" would be construed as limited to situations 
involving the sanctioned quartet of Section 2041(b)(l)(A). 
The Tenth Circuit's opinion is not a model of clarity. It rests heavily 
on dictionary definitions and much of the reasoning seems to be conclu- 
sory. The opinion, however, was cited with approval by a district court 
in Hunter v. United States» in support of a holding that the term emer- 
gency is always "measurable in terms of health or to support a benefi- 
ciary's standard of living."51 
Whether or not these cases portend the eventual acceptance of the 
term emergency as an ascertainable standard it is probable that the road 
to acceptance will not be smooth. The careful estate planner should se- 
riously consider whether the term emergency really adds anything to a 
standard of invasion. After all, the Hunter court approved the term by 
reasoning that it really was synonymous with a beneficiary's health or 
support needs. If that is the case, why raise the problems sure to come 
from the use of a questionable term. Unless local law makes it clear that 
, the approved language of Regulation Section 20.2041-1 ( c )(2) will not allow 
exercise of the power in an emergency there would seem to be no need 
to engage in creative drafting. 
The questions accompanying the use of the ascertainable standard 
exception to the definition of a general power of appointment may dis- 
courage its use. In addition, it does not provide absolutely unfettered 
access to trust property by a beneficiary. Unfettered access is possible, 
however, without the consequences of possession of a general power of 
appointment so long as the beneficiary is subject to limitations on the 
amount of property that can be obtained. The so-called five and five power 
of Section 2041 (b )(2) ,is an exception to the general rule that regards the 
lapse of a general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, 
as an exercise. The statute provides that a taxable la se occurs only '.:19 
the extent that the property, w 1ch could have been appointed by exercise 
of such lapsed powers exceeded in value, at the time of such lapse" the 
greater of $,5,000 or 5 percent "of the aggregate value, at the time of such 
lapse, of the assets out of which ... the exercise of the lapsed powers 
could have been satisfied." , - 
To phrase this in a more positive way, a rower in a beneficiary: to 
withdraw annually the reater of $5,000 or 5 percent of the value of the 
corpus of a trust will have no transfer tax consequences. f the power 
is not exercise"d in any year the lapse will be shelf ed by Section 
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2041(b)(2). Similarly, a power to withdraw income is sheltered to the 
extent of the greater of $5,000 or 5 percent of the income. The with- 
drawal can be for any purpose whatsoever and requires no justification 
on the beneficiary's part. 
The only trap in this arrangement involves the beneficiary's death 
before the power has lapsed for the year. If the withdrawal can be made 
at any time, the beneficiary will die possessing a general power of ap- 
pointment. Death while possessed of a power .is not a lapse. The gross 
estate will include the property that could have been withdrawn. Exposure 
to taxation in this way can be greatly reduced if the time period for exercise 
of the power is limited. For example, if the power is limited to exercise 
during the last two weeks of the month of December, the property that 
could have been withdrawn will be included in the beneficiary's gross 
estate only if death occurs during those two weeks.52 Presumably, the 
period of exercise should be coordinated with an annual valuation of the 
trust so that the 5 percent figure is easily ascertained. 
The consequences of a lapse over an amount greater than that shel- 
tered by the five and five rule are the same as that, of any lapse.53 The 
powerholder is considered to be the transferor of the property over which 
the power has lapsed. Depending on the terms of the trust there may or 
may not be transfer tax consequences. If the income beneficiary of a trust 
the remainder of which belongs to someone else has a one time power to 
withdraw $10,000 in one year from corpus, the lapse of that power in a 
year in which the corpus is worth $100,000 will result in a transfer of 
$5,000 to the trust [$10,000 - (5% of $100,000)]. There will be a gift of 
the actuarial value of the remainder interest in the trust; the beneficiary 
has retained the income interest in the $5,000. In addition, the beneficiary 
is now the transferor of 5 percent of the entire value of the trust (of the 
$10p,ooo in the trustthe beneficiary is the transferor of $5,000 by virtue 
of the lapse). Assuming that there are no further withdrawal powers, when 
the beneficiary dies 5 percent of the value of the trust at that time will be 
included in his or her gross estate under Section 2036(a)(l). The benefi- 
ciary has transferred $5,000 to a trust in which he or she has an income 
interest, a transaction which fits Section 2036 precisely. 
~ If the withdrawal power is annual and noncumulative, successive 
lapses will increase the proportion of the corpus. which the beneficiary 
has transferred. In the example .in 'the previous paragraph, if the power 
to withdraw $10,000 can be exercised every y.ear, .and assuming that the 
corpus of the trust always is valued at $100,000 each year, the beneficiary 
will transfer $5,000, make a gift of the remainder interest in that amount 
and become the transferor .of 5 percent of the trust corpus. If the bene- 
ficiary dies in the fifth year, his or her taxable estate willinclude first, the 
$10,000 that could have been withdrawn in that year, since that is a general 
power of appointment subject to Section 204~ and, second, 20 percent of 
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the corpus of the trust under Section 2036(a)(l).54 Each year the benefi- 
ciary transferred 5 percent of the corpus; after four years the beneficiary 
has become the transferor of 20 percent of the corpus. Of course, these 
calculations become more. complex as the value of the trust changes. In 
any event, if the lapse of the withdrawal power is not fully sheltered by 
Section 204l(b)(2) the transfer tax consequences can become quite serious. 
Perhaps the most common use of the five and five power is in con- 
nection with the creation of a so-called Crummey power. The name comes 
from Crummey v. Commissioner, 55 which stands for the proposition that 
um to a trust, which would otherwise be at least in part a gift of a future 
interest, can be transformed into a gift of a present interest, $10,000· of 
Wiiicli' is excluded from taxable gifts by Section 2503(b), to the extent that 
a beneficiary can demand the distribution to himself of the _aift. S~ 
demand power is a general power of appointment the lapse of which will 
have tax consequences to the extent it exceeds the limits of the five and 
five power. • 
Crummey powers are often used in inter vivos life insurance trusts 
!o provide a present interest exclusion for amounts contributed directly 
or indirectly to the trust for the payment of premiums, Of course the - 
technique can be used with any trust in order to allow funding of the trust 
over a period of time without incurring gift tax. One consideration, how- 
ever, is always present when drafting a Crummey power. If the power to 
, withdraw can be satisfied only from the addition to the trust the 5 percent 
limit of Section 204l(b)(2) is applied to the amount of the addition. If, 
however, the withdrawal power may be satisfied from the entire corpus 
of the trust the 5 percent limit is applied to that entire amount. For ex- 
amp];, if the Crummey power is phrased so that the beneficiarymay 
withdraw from the trust any additions made fo a given year, $10,000 of 
additions will result in a $5,000 taxable lapse-$5,000 is greater than 5 
percent ($500) of the property from which the withdrawal can be satisfied. 
The result of the lapse will depend on the rules for taxation of a general 
power outlined above. If the withdrawal power is phrased to allow the 
withdrawal from the entire trust of an amount equal to the year's additions, 
a $10,000 addition will result in a taxable lapse only if the trust's total 
value is less than $,100,000. 
The increase in the present interest exclusion to $10,000 effective 
January l, 1982, has led to attempts to obtain the fullest possible exclusion 
without exceeding the protection from lapse of Section 2041 (b )(2). Perhaps 
the most ingenious approach is the "hanging power."56 This variation is 
drafted to allow in any one year the lapse of a withdrawal power only to 
the extent it is sheltered by the five and five rule. Any power to withdraw 
more than the sheltered amount continues until the next year when the 
power again lapses only to the extent it is sheltered by Section_204l(b)(2). 
This pattern continues until the withdrawal powers have completely ended. 
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Of course, this technique is useful only where additions to the trust will 
continue for a fixed number of years and where the life expectancies of 
the holder or holders of the Crummey powers are long enough to allow 
the planner to be reasonably sure that all the powers will totally lapse 
before death or termination of the trust. If a powerholder dies while 
possessing unlapsed powers, Section 2041 will include the property that 
could be withdrawn at death in the gross estate.57 
The mechanics. of the Crummey power are fairly well established, 
The beneficiary. must have notice of the existence of the power and a 
reasonable time in which to exercise it.58 Minors may hold withdrawal 
. powers with au the attendant benefits so long as. there is no impediment 
under local law to the appointment of a guardian who could exercise the 
_rights on their behalf." In fact, the Crummey power has becomea most 
powerful tool, · .. . _ . 
. Recently, however, there are indications that the !RS is beginning to 
attemptto restrict the benefits of this device. In Revenue Ruling. 85-88 the 
IR.S dealt with multiple withdrawal powers held by a single beneficiary in 
multiple identical trusts created by the same grantor. The IRS ruled that the 
lapses of the withdrawal powers in the identical trusts must be.agg(egated: 
In other words, only one $5,000 amount was available to shelter the lapse. 
The 5 percent limit is applied to the aggregate amount of property from which 
the withdrawal could be satisifed. If the trusts are small, 5 percent of the 
aggregate amount may be less than $5,000 and any lapse greater than that 
amount will not be sheltered. This ruling leaves open the question. ~f aggre- 
gation where dissimilar trusts created by different grantors are involved. 
Should the instant holding be extended questions will arise involving pro- 
ration of the single available five and five shelter. ' 
. The second significant recent ruling, Revenue Ruling 85~24,, involved 
the creation of trusts with Crummey powers by each -of three members 
ofa partnership. Each trust gave to the graritors child a withdrawal power 
and also gave similar powers to each of the other two partners. The IRS 
( invoked the reciprocal trust doctrine of Estate of Grace= to deny a present 
interest exclusion based on the powers held by the partners. Clearly, the 
creation of reciprocal withdrawal powers is to be avoided. 
Finally, a word must be given to the income tax consequences of the 
withdrawal power. This aspect of the .. Crummey power has not received 
much attention.6' In a recent private letter ruling, however, the IRS took 
a position that could lead to severe income tax consequences for holders 
of withdrawal powers.62 The ruling holds that the powerholder is taxable 
on the income generated by the property that could be withdrawn during 
the period in which the power may be exercised. This result is in full accord 
with Section 678(a)(l). Since the withdrawal is usually exercisable only for 
a short period, the tax consequences of this portion of the ruling need not 
be significant. The ruling goes on, however, to assert that the powerholder 
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will remain taxable on all the income generated by the portion of the trust 
over which the withdrawal power has lapsed. The IRS reaches this con- 
clusion by finding that the lapse is a release for purposes of Section 678(a)(2). 
Should this proposition become well established the use of Crummey pow- 
ers will become far more difficult. The problems are only magnified by the 
"kiddie tax" provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 since many 
powerholders are minors. 
The final method of preventing a power to appropriate from being 
treated as a general power of appointment involves joint powers. First, 
if a power created on or before October 21, 1942, is exercisable only in 
conjunction with another person, it is not a general power of appointment. 
If the power is created after October 21, 1942, it is not a general power 
of appointment if it is exercisable only in conjunction with the creator of 
the power. If the power is exercisable only in conjunction with a person 
who has a substantial interest in the property subject to the power that 
is adverse to exercise in the decedent's favor, the power is not a general 
power of appointment. Finally, if after the two exceptions just mentioned 
are taken into account the power is a general one but exercisable in favor 
of the other powerholder it is considered a general power in the decedent - 
only to the extent of the decedent's aliquot portion of the property subject 
to the power. In other words, the powerholders are assumed to agree to 
divide the appointive property among themselves. 
The operation of these provisions are well illustrated by the applicable 
Treasury Regulations.63 On the whole, the deliberate creation of joint 
powers does not seem to be a popular planning technique. If we recall 
that the usual goal is to give a beneficiary access to property 'without 
giving the 'beneficiary a general power of appointment that will result in 
transfer tax consequences, the disadvantages of the jointly held power 
are evident. The price of the exception is an adverse interest in the other 
powerholder. In other words, the cooperation of that other powerholder 
is necessary to allow the beneficiary access to the appointive property. 
Attitudes can change and no matter how cooperative the other power- 
holder (and that powerholder must be a person=-corporations, including 
corporate fiduciaries, are not considered to have adverse interests) may 
be when the power is created, a change of heart can completely derail 
the best laid plans. The exceptions based on ascertainable standards and 
the five and five power depend only on the skill of the draftsperson. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the power of appointment is an important tool for meeting 
clients' needs for flexible estate plans. The transfer tax principles involved 
in its use are fairly well settled and really quite favorable to accomplishing 
many commonestate planning goals. · 
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